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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administrator of the 
Estate of William Kirkham, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ORIEN A. SPENCER and VIOLA SPENCER, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
' \ 
CASE 
NO. 8291 
On the 25th day of January, 1952, William Kirkham, 
now cleceased, entered into a written contract of sale of 
certain real property which is described in the complaint of 
the plaintiffs to Orien A. Spencer and Viola Spencer, his 
wife, for the sum of $5,993.38, payable at the rate of $65.00 
per month or more, with intevest at the rate of five per cent. 
At pre-trial the parties stipulated that the plaintiff, 
Thomas F. Kirkham, is the duly appointed, qualified and 
acting executor and that the contract of sale properly de-
scribes the property and that the terms of the contract are 
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accurate. The only fact reserved for trial was whether the 
defendants paid to the plaintiff's decedent during the month 
of August, 1953, the sum of $4,800.00. It was the defend-
ants' contention that this amount had been paid and it was 
the plaintiff's position that it had not. 
It would appear from the evidence presented by the 
plaintiff that the decedent was 77 years of age at the time 
of his death, which was on September 6, 1953, and that he 
was a widower and had lived alone for a long while. That 
his brother, the plaintiff, did all his business for him, in-
cluding his banking, and even assisted to the extent of draw-
ing his contracts, (Tr. P. 4), and that this relationship had 
continued for at least 10 years prior to his death. 
Near the last of August the plaintiff testified that he 
visited Mr. Hinton, at the request of the decedent, to retain 
him to collect the delinquent amount then owing under the 
contract with the defendants. The plaintiff judged the date 
to be August 30, 1954. 
The plaintiff testified that he did all the banking fior 
his brother and that he did not bank any amount of $4,-
800.00. He admits that he did not inquire as to whether 
the decedent had other bank accounts (Tr. P. 16) and he 
further admits that he did not make a search of the home 
and property of the decedent for any assets that may have 
been on hand at the date of death, (Tr. P. 16) and that the 
only inquiry that he made as to the assets of the !eState 
were from two members of the decedent's family (Tr. P. 
16). The plaintiff further admitted upon cross-examina-
tion that he did not know what monies we.re on hand at 
the decedent's death or in his house, or in his wallet (Tr. 
P. 17), and that he made no effort to find out. The plain-
tiff further admitted that he did not deposit all the money 
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received by the decedent, and that he did not know what 
happened to some of the money (Tr. P. 18), and that, in 
fact, the only nl)oney that he deposited was that money 
given to him to deposit by the decedent. The plaintiff sta-
ted on P. 36 of the transcript that he cannot remember what 
any of the children told him about what they found in the 
way of assets, if anything. 
The only other witness called by the plaintiff at the 
time of trial was Cleo K. Beagley, a daughter of the de-
Qeased. She testified that she was present in the horuse 
after the death of her father, and that she took part in a 
search that was made of the house. She stated that as far 
as her personal search was concerned, she, searched the 
linen closet (Tr. P. 41), and that she was present when the 
desk was searched, although she does nort recall what par-
ticular part she played in searching the desk. She admitted 
that she made no inquiry at any bank (Tr. P. 42) or that 
she looked in any place other than the house in search of 
the assets of the estate. She confirmed on Page 40 of the 
transcript that the only place that the family searched was 
in the house. 
After this evidence the plaintiff rested. 
Defendant here moved to dismiss the case on the 
grounds that the plaintiff did not prove a cause of action, 
the evidence being insufficient to sustain the eomplaint, and 
that the facts proven ~did not show a right to relief. The 
defendant's motion was denied. 
The defendant then proceeded to introduce Defendant's 
Exhibit 3, a receipt for $4,800.00 signed by decedent. The 
handwriting expert who testified (Tr. P. 47) stated that 
there was no doubt that the person who signed Defendant's 
Exhibits 1 and 2 signed the receipt, Exhibit 3, ~or $4,800.00. 
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Exhibits 1 and 2 were two contracts notarized by the plain-
tiff and which bore the decedent's signature and which sig-
natures the plaintiff admitted were genuine. The receipt 
was received in evidence. 
The defendant then called Orien A. Spencer, one of the 
defendants. The defendant was not allowed to testify con-
cerning the receipt because of the commonly called dead 
man's statute (Tr. P. 51). The defendant then rested. 
In rebuttal the plaintiff called as his witness his attor-
ney, who testified that prior to September 6, 1953, approxi-
mately September 1, 1953, that he wrote the defendant a 
letter asking him to come and see him but that the defend-
ant did not come and see ·him prior to September 29, 1953. 
This constituted the total rebuttal. 
At this stage the plaintiff again rested and the defend-
ant moved the court again to dismiss the case for the rea-
~on that the plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action, 
and that he had not carried the burden of proof in that the 
plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence for the court 
to reach a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and for the fur-
theT reason that the plaintiff had presented absolutely no 
evidence to refute the authenticity or genuineness of the 
receipt. 
The defendant's motion was denied and the court took 
the matter undeT advisement. 
The court on its own motion on the 19th day of Octo-
ber, 1954, ordered that further hearing upon the cause be 
heard on the 25th day of October, 1954, at 1:30 P.M., in 
order that the parties present evidence upon the following 
points, to-wit: 
"1. Evidence concerning the possession by the de-
fendants of the sum of $4,800.00 in cash which could 
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have been, or which probably was, paid to the deceased 
on or about the 21st day of August, 1953. 
2. Further evidence of the search by plaintiff and ;or 
the heirs of the decedent made either before or after 
the bringing on of the cause for trial to discover the 
possession of $4,800.00 in money in the decedent after 
the 21st day of August, 1953, including banks in the 
cities of Lehi, American Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo 
and Salt Lake City, and a more detailed search of the 
premises wherein deceased lived after August 21, 1953, 
and any other locations known to the heirs and rep-
resentatives of the decedent wherein the said decedent 
might have made temporary disposition of $4,800.00 
paid to him prior to plaintiff's return from vacation on 
August 22, 1953." 
On October 25, 1954, the defendant again moved the 
court to dismiss the case for the reasons stated at time of 
trial on October 19, 1954, and for the further reason that 
the court by reopening the case on its own motion and by 
designating what matters were to be pro~ed and horw they 
were to be proved, was acting beyond its authority and was, 
in any event, abusing its discretion. This motion was de-
nied. 
The attorney for the defendants was una:ble to notify 
the defendants of the court's order to reopen in time for 
the hearing. However, the plaintiff proceeded to introduce 
evidence along the line requested by the court, recalling to 
testify Thomas F. Kirkham, Harvard Hinton, plaintiff's at-
torney, and Cleo Beagley, and calling as a new witness Les-
lie Goates. The defendant again renewed his mooorn to 
dismiss, which was denied. 
The case was continued until November 6, 1954, for 
the purpose of allorwing the defendant to present the evi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
dence requested by the court's Order to Reopen; however, 
on the 5th of November, the parties, appeared before the 
court and the defendant rested without presenting further 
evidence. The plaintiff moved the court to re-open the case 
to allow the p1ainti~f to present further evidence, but the 
court denied the plaintiff's motion in this instance. The 
court took the matter under adviserrJ,ent. 
On November 8, 1954, the court rendered the judgment 
complained of. The defendants moved for a new trial, 
which motion was denied and the defendants appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END 
OF THiE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
AND FOR THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE 
PROVEQ WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO 
GRANT THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR. 
POINT 2 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DE-
FENDANT AFTER BOTH PARTIES HAD RESTED 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON 
THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS 
WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND 
WAS UNREFUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
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POINT 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN RE-OPENING THE CASE 
ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN DESIGNATING THE 
MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE THAT 
WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE COURT. 
POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANfS' 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE ER-
RORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
AND FOR THE. REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE 
PROVED WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO 
GRANT THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR. 
At the end of the plaintiff's case in chief the defendants 
moved the court to dismiss the plaintiff's ease (Tr. P. 43) 
for the reason that they had not proved a prima facie case. 
The defendants were then entitled to a non-suit on the basis 
of insufficiency of evidence. 
It was obviorus from the facts proven that there had 
been no showing that the defendant had not paid the $4,-
800.00. In fact, there were from the plaintiff's own testi-
mony many reasonable and probable e~xplanations of where 
the money was or had gone. It must be remembered that 
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the plaintiff brought this action and in his pleadings alleged 
that this payment among others had not been paid. This 
was specifically denied by the defendant and in fact the de-
fendants pleaded that the defendant made payments to the 
said William Kirkham regularly and consistently and ac-
cording to the contract, and that on the 21st day of August, 
1953, paid the decedent, William Kirkham, the sum of $4,-
800.00, which was believed to be the entire balance of the 
principal and interest owing on the contract, and the deced-
ent gave the defendants a receipt for $4,800.00 and agreed 
that he would calculate the exact amount owing and would 
deliver the deed to the defendant when he had done so and 
this amount was paid. The receipt which is admitted here-
in verifies such pleading. 
Surely it is incumbent that plaintiff prove lack of pay-
ment, and not just that the money did not appear as one 
item in a bank account that was handed to the Administra-
tor. 
The plaintiff testified (Tr. P. 12) in answer to his at-
torney's question that it was his duty to collect the assets 
of the estate and that he had filed an inventory, and in do-
ing so he had not found the $4,800.00. It is fundamental 
that one of the chief duties of the Executor is to collect and 
search out the assets of the estate. However, in this case, 
the Executor did nothing to find out what was owing the 
estate, or to search through the belongings of the decedent 
in an effort to discover whether the money had been found 
or was among the assets of the decedent, but because it 
was not in one item in the bank account book of the Lehi 
State Bank, he assumed that it had not been paid. The en-
tire testimony of the of the plaintiff on cross ~am!iantion 
indicated that there . was not sufficient proof to justify a 
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verdict. This is clearly shown by the following testimony: 
(Transcript P. 15, L. 17 to P. 18) 
MR. HOWARD: Q. "Did he ever bank anything 
without you being present, or without ~ou doing it or 
him? 
A. The last year or so I did all of his bankking 
for him. 
Q. How do you know you did? 
A. All that I know about, from this--
Q. You did all the banking in these two bank ac-
counts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't know whether or not he had a bank 
account in the Farmers & Merchants Bank in Provo, 
do you? 
MR. HINTON: Yiour Honor, I object to that. He 
has testified, and it is in the inventory, that there were 
no other bank accounts. He is badgering the witness. 
THE COURT: He may be cross examined about 
it anyway. Overruled. 
MR. HOWARD: Q. You don't know whether or 
not he had a bank account in the Farmers & Merchants 
Bank, do you? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. And you don't know whether he had one in 
the Peoples State Bank, of American Fork? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Or in the Pleasant Grove Bank? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. Or in any other bank, but the Lehi Bank, do 
you? 
A. That is the only bank I know about. 
Q. Did you ,make inquiry at any other bank ? 
A. I did not. 
Q. So he might have had a bank account some-
where else, and you might not know it; isn't that so? 
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A. Could be so. 
Q. That's right. And where did you look for 
money? 
A. Where did who look for money? 
Q. Yes, you didn't find any in his home? 
A. Ask your first question. 
Q. Where did you look for money, when you 
searched the assets of the estate? 
A. I did not search the assets, at the time of his 
death. 
Q. Well, subsequently, did you search the assets 
of the estate? 
A. From all the evidence that was given to me 
by members of his family, I took the assets. 
Q. What inquiry did you, yourself, as adminis-
trator of the estate, make in the affairs and property 
of the decedent? What inquiry did you make as to 
property? What was in his house? 
A. Two members of his family. 
Q. Did they do it? 
A. They searched his belongings. 
Q. But you didn't? 
A. I didn'rt:. 
Q. In fact, you have made no search ~at all your-
self, have you, into his belongings? Have you? 
A. I have taken all of his accormts, and listed 
them. 
Q. From what somebody gave you? 
A. From what he gave me. 
Q. Did you go through his bureau drawers. 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did ~ou go through the cupboard in the 
kitchen? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you go through the things in the base-
ment? 
A. I did not. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Q. Or anyplace in the house? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Or the shelves of the closet? 
A. No. 
Q. So you don't know what moneys were on hand 
at his death in his house, do you? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You didn't go in his wallet, did you? 
A. I did not. The ~mbers of his family did all 
of those things. It was their concern, not mine. 
Q·. Who were there when they did these things? 
A. His children. 
Q. Who were they? 
A. Well, he has fuur children. 
Q. Which child did these things, to your knowl-
edge? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know who did it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You filed an affidavit with the Court that a 
search had been made, and that these were the things 
in his estate, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And yert you had not made a search had you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make a search? 
A. Sure, to get all these records together. 
Q. But you didn't make a search of the assets 
of the estate? 
A. From the members o!f his family. 
Q. Did you deposit everything Mr. Kirkham re-
ceived in the bank? 
A. Not everything, no, sir. 
Q. What did he do with some of the moneys that 
he received? 
A. I don't know. 
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Q. He had moneys that he received that he didn't 
deposit, didn't he? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, you know he didn't deposit everything 
he received, don't you? 
A. I don't know that. 
Q. Let me ask you this then, Mr. Kirkham: Did 
you deposit all the moneys that were received from 
Mr. Albert Peterson, on a contract of Mr. Peterson? 
A. I don't know what ~oney that he brought to 
me represented. What money he brought to me, to 
deposit for him, I deposited. Other than that, I made 
no deposits for him, only money that he brought to me, 
to take over to the bank for him, is what I deposited 
for him.'' 
You will note specifically that he admits that no search 
was made (Tr. P. 16). He states, "I did not search the as-
sets, at the time of death", and that (Tr. P. 17) he only 
took what assets were given to him by members of the de-
cedent's family. 
How could the court conclude from this testimony, and 
this is the principal testim!ony of the plaintiff's case, that 
the defendants had not paid the $4,800.00, especially where 
by their pleadings they state that they did thereby pui'ffie 
matter in issue. The only further evidence the court could 
take into consideration was the testimony of Mrs. Beagley, 
who ~ould testify only to what she found and as to what 
she did, and she testified in substance and effect that she 
did not find the $4,800.00, although she admits that in the 
house at the same time searching was her sister, her two 
brothers and her husband. She admits (Tr. P. 41) that 
she searched the linen closet alone, which obviously means 
that the others were doing something else. She also ad-
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mits that the search she made, and what she supposes 
the others made, was limited to the house (Tr. P. 42), and 
that she nor anyone else made any further search other 
than in the house, her reply being "That wasn't my job, 
that was the administrator's job." (Tr. P. 42) 
Mr. Hinton's testimony was without any probative 
merit, the subSitance of it being that he wrote a letter to 
the defendant, Mr. Spencer, on September 1, 1953, and that 
by Septent.ber 29th the defendant had not been in to see 
him (Tr. P. 57, L. 19 to 22). 
It is so fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden 
of proof that the defendant will not on this point submit 
authorities. The defendants are aware that the burden in 
this case requires the plaintiff to prove somewhat of a neg-
ative proposition, that of non-payment; however, even in 
this case a mere statement that it was not paid is not suf-
ficient. Something more must be shown. There should be, 
at least, a showing by some evidence that it was not paid; 
!his is done in the usual case by the obligee testifying that 
he did not receive the money. In the instant case the obli-
gee is dead, so it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show 
that he did not receive the money. Is it sufficient for the 
plaintiff to show this by testifying that he has looked in a 
bank book of the decedent and someone has told him that 
they searched the decedent's desk and didn't find it? Is 
it again sufficient when one of the searchers as corrobora-
tion says she didn't find it but admits her search was. limi-
ted to the decedent's house, and then to only parts of it? 
It was so obvious that the money was, and probably is, so:rne-
place else that the court should have granted a non-suit. 
Even the trial court, by its own order, admitted that the 
money had probably been paid and that if the plaintiff 
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looked he would probably find it. The court said in its order 
to the defendant to produce more evidence: 
"1 Evidence concerning the possession by the de-
fendants of the sum of $4,800.00 cash which could have 
been, or which probably was, paid to deceased on or 
about the 21st day of August, 1953." 
(Emphasis added) 
Surely the plaintiff should have at least probable rea-
sons to believe the debt to be unpaid before causing the de-
fendants to defend a Ia w suit, and where it is apparent from 
the plaintiff's own testimony that the debt could have been 
paid, then there is a failure of proof. A good way to ana-
lyze the problem is to say: "Assume the defendants had 
rested without presenting any evidenoe, could the court at 
this stage and having received this quantum of evidence, 
have granted judgment to the plaintiff?" The answer to 
this question is "no". 
The appellant's contention that they should have been 
granted a non-suit in the case below upon the facts stated 
could not be stated more clearly than in the language used 
by this Court in the case of Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 
P.2d 205. That was a case brought by the plaintiff tore-
cover for the loss of a Diesel engine allegedly caused by 
the negligent installation of an oil filter bag by the defend-
ant's employee, and was tried without a jury. The fact to 
be proved in that case was that the filter bag, because of its 
negligent installation, clogged the oil line, thereby causing 
the damage complained of. 
The plaintiff proved that such an installation could have 
caused such damage; however, upon cross-examination the 
defendant established that some other causes could have 
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clogged the oil line. Similar to the principal case in which 
the plaintiff says he hasn't seen the $4,800.00 but where 
the defendant establishes upon cross-examination that he 
hasn't looked for it and that it might very well have been 
found if he had looked. The court in that case said: 
"It is not reasonable to require a judge, on motion 
to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) , to determine merely 
whether there is a prima facie case, such as in a jury 
trial should go to the jury, when there is no jury--
to determine merely whether there is a prima facie case 
sufficient for the consideration of a trier of facts when 
he is himself the trier of the facts. To apply the jury 
trial practice in a non-jury proceedings would be to 
erect a requirement compelling a defendant to put on 
his case and the Court to spend the time and incur the 
public expense of hearing it if the plaintiff had, accord-
ing to jury trial concepts, made a ,case for the jury, even 
though the judge had concluded that on the whole of 
the plaintiff's evidence the plaintiff ought not to pre-
vail. A plaintiff who had had full opportunity to put 
on his own case and has failed to convince the judge, 
as trier of the facts, of a right to relief, has no legal 
right under the due process clause of the Constitution, 
to hear the defendant's case, or to compel the Court to 
hear it, merely because the plaintiff's case is a prima 
facie one in the jury trial sense of the term." 
Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205 
But even assuming that this case had been tried before 
a jury, the plaintiff did not establish, even then, a case that 
would have prevented a non-suit under the rule announced 
in the above case, wherein the court said: 
"If art the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the 
Court decides that the plaintiff has not established a 
prima facie case or cause of action against the defend-
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ant, a judgment of non-suit may be properly entered. 
In order to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff 
must present some competent evidence on every ele-
ment needed to make out the cause of action. The test 
is whether or not there is some substantial evidence in 
support of every essential fact which the plaintiff is re-
quired to prove in order to entitle him to recover. Ro-
binson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817. If 
the evidence and the inferences are of such character 
as would authorize reasonable men to arrive at different 
conclusions as to whether all the essential facts were 
or were not proved, then the question is one for the 
jury and a non-suit should be denied." 
Even by the test used in cases in which there is a jury, 
it is difficult to see how reasonable men could differ on 
the question that the facts proven did not prove a cause 
of action. It is obvious that there were essential facts not 
proven, such as whether the plaintiff knew upon some rea-
sonable basis that the $4,800.00 had not been paid. There 
cannot be found anywhere in the record any substantial 
proof of non-payment. 
The court was the trier of the fact in this particular 
case, and its view of the evidence can probably not be ques-
tioned as to what we!ight was placed upon it, but in regard 
to whether the defendant testified in a convincing and per-
suasive manner, the court should note his inability to iden-
tify the signature of his brother, the decedent, upon re-
peated examination, and when asked to compare the pur-
ported signature with the admittedly genuine signature, his 
testimony is seen to be hostile, purposely unresponsive, and 
evasive. (See Tr. Pages 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, where he 
says, when questioned about his brother's signature, that he 
could not recognize anything that he didn't notarize, and 
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then compare it with his testimony on Page 77 of Transcript 
in regard to a letter he received from the Bank of Pleasant 
Grove about a bank account.) 
Referring to the letter: 
Q. "And what bank is it? 
A. Bank of Pleasant Grove. 
Q. And who is this signed by? 
A. J. A. West, Vice-President and Cashier. 
Q. Do you know who Mr. West is? 
A. I do. 
Q. And do you know that he is the Vice-Presi-
dent and Cashier of that particular bank? 
A. Yes Sir. 
MR. HINTON: Your Honor, we offer Plaintiff's 
Exhibit U in as evidence. 
MR. HOWARD: May I voir dire the witness, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. HOWARD: Q. Do you recognize that as 
Mr. Junius West's signature? 
A. I do, yes." 
Page 81 of Transcript: 
Q. "Is there any reason why you would be more 
able to recognize Mr. Junius West's signature than you 
would Mr. William Kirkham's signature?" 
A. I do not know. 
Q. You mean you do not know of a reason? 
A. I do not know of a reason. 
Q. You were unable to identify Mr. Kirkham's 
signature, weren't you? (referring to Page 23, etc.) 
A. Sometimes I do not know. 
Q. Which times are they, Mr. Kirkham? 
A. I do not know." 
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There is no question that the defendants have denied all 
the rr•aterial allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and by 
stipulation the only issue being whether the $4,800.00 had 
been paid and the plaintiff having failed to prove, even 
slightly, that it had not, should have been non-suited. A 
good discussion of the burden of proof in general is found 
in Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 1, Page 896. 
POINT 2 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DE-
FENDANT AFTER BOTII PARTIES HAD RESTED 
SHOULD HlA VE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON 
THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT 
WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND 
WAS UNREFUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
When both parties had rested the defendant again made 
a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case for insufficiency of 
the evidence. At this time it would appear to the appellants 
that there -could be no question but that the court should 
deny the plaintiffs judgment and should dismiss their com-
plaint because of a failure of proof. The court by its order 
says as much, otherwise there would be no point in requir-
the plaintiff to submit further evidence and specifying the 
kind of evidence necessary, unless there was an insufficien-
cy of evidence that would prohibit the court from granting 
judgment. 
When the defendant introduced the receipt, it had 
itself proved a prima facie case. It is the law that one 
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prima facie case is sufficient to offset or equalize the case 
presented by the plaintiff in his ·case in chief. The general 
rule in this respect is as follows: 
"The presumption that a debt evidenced by a ne-
gotiable instrument is unpaid arising from the produc-
tion of the instrument by the payee is rebutted by re-
ceipts in full for all claims due to the payee which were 
admitted by the payee's failure to deny their genuine-
ness or validity." 
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 6, P. 3939 
There was not one scintilla of evidence offered by the 
plaintiff in the case below to rebut the receipt offered, nor 
was it contradicted or explained. Under such circumstan-
ces the law is that such a receipt is conclusive evidence of 
payment. 
"A receipt is merely prima facie evidence, and is 
not conclusive, unless not contradicted or explained." 
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol 4, Sec. 6, P. 3939 
(Emphasis added) 
''A receipt in full of all demands, unexplained and 
uncontradicted, will defeat an action on a negotiable in-
strument given before the date of the receipt." 
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 8, P. 3940 
McKenzie v. Ray, 168 Cal. 618, 143 Pac. 1018 
"A receipt for money is prima facie evidence of 
the truth of the statements therein contained." 
U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Martin, 77 Ore. 369, 149 Pac. 
1923 
"A receipt is not an instrument that the law re-
quires for protection of, or as notice to third parties, 
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but is only prima facie evidence of payment of an ob-
ligation." 
Amer. Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 Kan. 35 
Kuykendall v. Lambert, 68 Okla. 258, 173 Pac. 657 
"A receipt acknowledging the payment of money 
is prima facie evidence of payment, in favor of the par-
ty producing it, when the genuineness of the receipt 
is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but such 
evidence may be rebutted by competent testimony." 
Stout v. Myatt, 13 Kans. 232 
If we ~search the record we will find nowhe·re within a 
denial or a contraduction of any sort in regard to the re-
ceipt. It was introduced and is self-explanatory In a sim-
ilar case from California in which the receipt was given and 
no reasonable explanation was offered, (although the ex-
planation offered was at least ·more substantial than the ab-
solutely unrefuted rec€-i.pt in this case) the court in review-
ing the evidence said: 
"To meet this evidence (evidence of indebtedness) 
respondent produced a receipt dated June 16, 1930, 
which is in the following language: 'Received of J. R. 
Brightman ten dollars payed in full up to date. $10.00. 
Mrs. M. E. Brown.' Appellant admitted signing this 
receipt, but testified that it was given to her to cover 
rental of a room occupied by Brightman. It was for 
the trial court to determine whether or not appellant's 
testimony in this regard was true. The language of 
the receipt is sufficiently broad to indicate that it 
amounted to a written acknowledgment that payment 
in full of all demands had been made It is now the rule 
that a receipt is evidence of a high order which is en-
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titled to. prevail, unless overcome by clear and satis-
factory evidence." 
Brown v. Gow, 18 P.2d 377, 128 Cal. App. 671 
(Emphasis and parenthesis added) 
In the above case the court had to interpolate even to 
determine that the receipt was applicable to the debt sued 
upon; however, in the pres.ent case, there is no question 
about it. In fact, its authenticity is even more apparent 
when we read the receipt. 
Defendants' Exhibit 3 
Received of Orien Spencer 
~orty-Eight Hundred Dollars 
"August 21, 1953 
Final payment on Home, Principal to be adjusted and 
deeds to be received. 
$4800.00 js/ William Kirkham" 
In fact, the trial judge's own consideration of the re-
ceipt is of significance. On (Tr. P: 64) he says: 
"I can tell you now, that I am inclined to think 
that the Court is going to be bound to give full credit 
to the receipt. I think the Court is going to be bound 
to do that. That is subject to further consideration, 
but so that--there are people here, that are inter-
ested, and would like to know what the Court's trend 
of thought is. There is a definite argument upon the 
face of Exhibit 3, and it was emphasized by counsel 
and the Court has observed it: If this were a faked 
receipt, it is hard for the Court to see any reason why 
there would be the added statement in it: "Principal 
to be adjusted and deeds to be received." 
The court goes on justifying its conclusion about the 
receipt, as can be seen in the Transcript, P. 64. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
In the case of Gallaher v. Theilbar Realities, which case 
is in point upon the question of payment and receipt, the 
court said: 
"A receipt is not a contract and may therefore be 
explained or contradicted by parol evidence, 20 Cal. 
Jur. 956, but it is prima facie evidence of payment, and 
therefore the production of a receipt imposes upon the 
plaintiff the burden of 'going forward to impeach the 
receipt.'" 48 C. J. 639. 
"* * * * There was no attempt made to impeach 
the receipt or to explain that it was intended to be oth-
er than it appeared on its face. * * * * " 
"Under applicaJble law heretofore stated, the de-
endant made a prima facie showing of payment which 
was not overcome in any manner; and consequently 
the implied finding that the note was nort given and re-
ceived as absoJute payment is not sustained by any evi-
dence. Judgment is reversed and the cause remanded 
to the district court of Cascade County, with direction 
to enter judgment of dismissal in favor of the defend-
ant." 
Gallaher v. Theilbar Realties, 18 P2d 1101, 93 
Mont. 421 
The law announced above would put the plaintiff or 
respondent in the identieal position of the plaintiff in the 
above case, which would put upon the respondent the bur-
den of "going forward to impeach the receipt," which the 
facts show the respondent did not do. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN RE-OPENING THE CASE 
ON ITS OWN MOrriON AND IN DESIGNATING THE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE THAT 
WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THiE COURT. 
The appellants concede that broad latitude and dis-
cretion is allowed the trial court in matters of reopening a 
case. However, nowhere have the appellants been able to 
find authority that would support the action of the court in 
this case, where the initiating movant was the court itself. 
A motion to reopen is always made by one of the par-
ties, and ordinarily it is upon the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. As a general rule the ·court will grant the mo-
tion if it can be shown that the evidence to be produced is 
of a material nature. This is usually established by affi-
davit or by an offer of proof. 
It is also a general rule, and one that is seldom abused, 
that the attorney is the best judge of what evidence he de-
sires to introduce, and in what manner he wants to try his 
case. It may well be that he is not as skilled as the court, 
however, he must account to his client for his actions, and 
it must be assumed that the trial procedures used are to the 
best interests of his client. If this fundamental principle is 
not so, then it would be just as well if the parties were not 
represented by counsel and that the court by its own meth-
ods interrogate the parties, determine what evidence it de-
sires to receive, and to resolve the differences between the 
parties. It would appear to the appellants that this is no 
more and no less than what the court did in the instant ·case. 
Not only were the defendants unable to govern the 
course of conduct of their side of the trial, but they were 
also required to defend their position twice on two differ-
ent occasions with respect to matters that they could prop-
erly have defended themselves on in the first trial. There 
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is no showing, and it cannot even be implied, that the facts 
that the plaintiff was ordered to produce could not have 
been produced at the regularly scheduled time of trial. 
The great harm in such procedure is that it informs 
the parties of the court's pre-decision of the matter upon 
the condition that the facts ordered produced are produced. 
It allows (as is obvious from the transcript in the principal 
case) the witnesses to change their testimony in such re-
spects as to conform with the order of the court. For ex-
ample, take the testimony of Mrs. Beagley. Upon the first 
trial her testimony was quite specific that her search was 
limited to the house and that she did certain things alone 
and did not know what the other parties did at all tim.es. 
When recalled, she was allowed to testify, over the defend-
ants' objection, to those facts that she had previously testi-
fied to; however, this time the search was of the most copi-
ous magnitude; it even included the garage and the grounds. 
Compare her testimony shown from P. 88 of the Transcript 
toP. 93 with her testimony on P. 42. There can be no ques-
tion but what her testimony was altered to satisfy the 
order of the court. 
The court's only basis for such an order is that it felt 
such an order was necessary to reach a just decision be-
tween the parties; however, it should be apparent that the 
injustice of such an order, and the abuse of discretion in 
granting such an order, far outweighs any additional evi-
dence which the court might receive in order to come to a 
conclusion resolving the matter. 
The appellants cannot find any authority either for or 
against the proposition of the court making such an order 
on its own motion. This is probably because such practice 
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is so obviously an ~~~ of discretion that no court has ven-
tured to do it before, and so no appellate court has had to 
rule on it. According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. 53, 
P. 109, cases may be reopened upon the motion of one of 
the sides, and then only to introduce material evidence 
which is either newly discovered, was not presented because 
of inadvertence or excusable neglect, and where it is ap-
parent that the party so moving has acted in good faith. 
The text authorities also indicate that the· time the 
motion is made also has a bearing on the right to reopen. 
In other words, a motion to reopen during the trial and be-
fore the case is submitted to the court or jury is much more 
favorably received than one made after the case is submit-
ted, and a motion made after court has taken a matter un-
der advisement, has been adjourned and the parties have 
excused their witnesses and have relied upon the respective 
rests of each of the litigants has even less standing and the 
court's discretion in this instance is even more limited. To 
hold otherwise would be to say that the court, on its own 
motion, can prolong the trial and retrial of a case indefin-
itely. 
In any event, a case should not be reopened to allow 
counsel to experiment rather than to develop his case. In 
the principal case the evidence introduced by counsel for 
plaintiff and respondent did nothing to refute the prima 
facie case established by the defendants, and was immate-
rial, irrelevant and incompetent evidence. All of the evi-
dence received after the trial, but pursuant to an order of 
the court, was gathered after the parties had rested and 
over a year from the date of death of the decedent. The 
very remoteness of such evidence would make it incompe-
tent because of the many factors that could and did inter-
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vene. For example, the house in which the decedent was 
living at the date of his death had been rented for approxi-
mately a year, and there is not even a showing of any kind 
that inquiry had been made of the tenants or that the house 
had been researched. Note the testimony of Mr. Hinton, 
attorney for the plaintiff, as set forth on Pages 99 and 100 
of the Transcript: 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q.,"Did you make any search other than that, Mr. 
Hinton? 
A. You mean--
Q. FOT the $4800. 
A. I searched all the papers and documents that 
were turned over to me by the administrator, and the 
same papers and documents that were testified were 
found on that search and turned over to Mr. Thomas 
Kirkham, the administrator. I checked each document 
carefully. 
Q. When was the house rented? 
A. As to the date, I couldn't be sure, but it would 
be approximately--! would say from two weeks to 
a month after the death. 
Q. Did you inquire of the people who rented the 
house, if they found any money? 
A. I did not. I didn't feel it was necessary. 
Q. Did Mr. Kirkham live alone? 
A. William Kirkham, he did. 
MR. HOWARD:! have no further questions. 
MR. HINTON: Your Honor, that will conclude 
our evidence as to that aspect of the case. We reserve 
our right to offer rebuttal evidence, when the defend-
ant's portion of the case is presented. 
MR. HOWARD: We again would like to renew 
our motion to dismiss, on the ground that they haven't 
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proved a prima facie case. We think the most obvious 
spot to look has been overlooked, and we think they 
haven't carried the burden. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied.'' 
Even taking the evidence that was offered pursuant to 
the order of the court, the plaintiff did not prove a prima 
facie case. The evidence received was merely cumulative 
in value and did nothing to refute or eontradiet the receipt. 
In fact, the evidence produced did not by any means show 
that, even then, a thorough search had been made, as in-
dicated in the above testimony. Surely at this time the 
court should have granted the defendant's motion. 
After the defendant had again rested, the plaintiff 
moved the court, this time on his own motion, to reopen the 
case for a second time to allow him to put in further evi-
dence that he claimed would add substantially to his case, 
and he made an offer of proof. This time the court quite 
properly refused to allow the motion of the plaintiff, and 
it was denied. 
POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND~S' 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE ER-
RORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT. 
The principal errors of law committed by the court and 
duly set out above constitute the foundation for this mo-
tion. It is the position of the appellants that the court hav-
ing been advised of its errors should have granted a new 
trial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case are novel, and errors committed 
are such that support injustice. In the first place, the court 
has instituted trial by new and novel procedure, and has 
deviated so far from the civil procedure that we know of 
that the appellants were unable to know to what extent 
they could rely upon orthodox procedure in the preparation 
and trial of their case. 
In the second place, viewing the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff, and giving him the benefit of all presumptions 
and inferences as can be applied to such evidence, he has 
not proved a prima facie case at any stage of trial. 
In the third place, assuming that the evidence presen-
ted by the plaintiff was sufficient to prove a prima facie 
case, it was not sufficient to allow the relief prayed for when 
contradicted and refuted by the receipt introduced by the 
defendants. At this time the plaintiff's case was at the 
very least equalized and the plaintiff did not meet his bur-
den of going forward to overcome the case presented by the 
defendants. 
Under no possible theory of law could the court have 
rightly decided the case as it did. The defendants respect-
fully petition this Court to reverse the ruling of the trial 
court and to order it to enter judgment for the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
SANDGREN, HOWARD AND FRAZIER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
290 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 
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